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1. Introduction 
Over the past 10-15 years, there has been a worldwide trend to change the way in which electricity industries 
are organised, from an integrated monopoly, often owned by central government, to a de-integrated structure, 
usually privately-owned and operated, where possible, within a competitive market.  This paper reviews the 
experience of these changes and draws lessons from a number of countries that have undertaken reforms. 
A particular problem in discussing changes to the electricity industry is terminology.  These changes are 
variously described as: ‘reforms’; ‘privatisation’; ‘liberalisation’; ‘deregulation’; and even ‘modernisation’.  
These words often have positive connotations with the public when used in a publicity campaign for change, 
instead of being debated ahead of their implementation as critically as they should have been.  More 
importantly, they do not accurately describe the changes that have taken place.  Most changes have required 
a major strengthening of the regulatory regime so deregulation is certainly not appropriate.  None of the 
terms describes a change from a monopoly to a competitive market (we argue that the competitive market in 
electricity cannot exist), arguably the most important justification advanced for making these changes.  In 
this paper, we use either ‘change’, or ‘re-organisation’ unless the meaning is more specific, e.g., 
privatisation. 
2. What is the liberalised model and what is its rationale 
2.1. The model 
Electricity industries were aiming to replicate the model that the 1990 changes to the UK electricity industry 
were meant to accomplish, which, themselves, drew on experience in Chile in the early 1980s.  The 
fundamental objective is to, wherever possible, replace (public) monopoly with (private) competition.  To 
achieve this, the sector is divided into four separate activities: 
 Wholesale: Electricity generation; 
 Retail: Retail to final consumers; 
 Transmission: The national (or regional) transmission networks that takes electricity at high voltage 
from point of production to centres of demand; and 
 Distribution: The local distribution networks that take electricity from the transmission networks to 
final consumers. 
According to theory, the rationale for this separation is that wholesale and retail can be made ‘competitive’ 
with prices set by markets.  It is assumed that sectors run on competitive lines are invariably more efficient 
than those run as monopolies and as a result, consumers will benefit through lower prices.  Transmission and 
distribution are natural monopolies and prices will be set by an independent regulator. 
The most important element of the model is the creation of a wholesale market as this is the largest element 
of an electricity bill, typically making up more than 50 per cent of the overall charge for electricity.  
Reductions in the cost of generation can make a significant difference to consumers’ bills.  Transmission (5-
10 per cent) and distribution (25-35 per cent) remain regulated monopolies so re-organisation here would not 
make a significant difference to their cost.  Retail is only about 5 per cent of the cost to consumers, so retail 
competition should not, in theory, be able to make much impact on overall prices unless the wholesale 
market was so imperfect that some retailers are able to buy much more cheaply than others.  A market with 
such serious flaws is unlikely to be efficient. 
For this model to work, the following conditions are generally seen as necessary: 
 An hourly or half hourly wholesale market should exist buying and selling electricity and would 
provide reliable price signals for purchases made outside this market and for investment decisions in 
new generating capacity; 
 A retail market should exist, in which all consumers are able to switch readily between retailers.  
This would place competitive pressure on suppliers to purchase wholesale power as cheaply as 
possible and inefficient or high-priced suppliers would be squeezed out of the market; 
 Access to the networks should be available to all wholesalers and retailers on equal terms.  This 
would require some form of ‘unbundling’ of the network businesses from the retail and wholesale 
businesses; and 
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 A regulatory body should exist to ensure that competition is fair, access to networks is impartial, 
competitive fields of companies exist in both wholesale and retail activities, and consumers are 
protected from exploitation by companies. 
One policy measure adopted by some countries was to unbundle or separate generation and retail.  This 
would appear to be a necessary step if wholesale markets are to be ‘liquid’, in other words, a significant 
proportion of sales pass through the market.  If the market is dominated by integrated generator/retailers, 
there will be no ‘liquidity’ in the wholesale markets and the main justification for the changes will be lost 
because price signals will not be reliable enough for buyers and sellers to trust.  As a result, in some 
countries that followed the British model, such as Brazil and Colombia, integration of generation and retail 
was made illegal. 
However, integration of generation and retail is highly desirable, and probably necessary for generation 
companies because it means that, instead of selling their power into an unpredictable wholesale market 
where they cannot know from one 30-minute period to the next how much power they will sell and at what 
price, if they integrate generation and retail, they sell directly to final consumers with price and volumes that 
are much more predictable. 
In the Chilean and British electricity models, a key goal was to change from national public ownership to 
private.  For some organisations promoting changes to the electricity sector, such as the World Bank, 
privatisation is still the main objective and the introduction of competition is a much lower priority.  
However, the European Union (EU) has no jurisdiction over ownership of member states’ industries so 
change of ownership is not, and cannot be, any part of the EU’s attempts, through its Electricity Directives, 
to create a single European market in electricity.  But it is forcing open markets, meaning that private owners 
must be allowed into the sector. 
The Scandinavian countries of Norway, Finland and Sweden did open their markets with some success, but 
the industry remains mainly in public hands and change of ownership has not been part of the changes. 
3. Criteria for judging electricity re-organisation policies 
An important issue is the criteria against which these changes should be judged.  The most obvious starting 
point for judging a policy is to evaluate it against the objectives that the policy was expected to achieve.  
There have been a wide range of motivations for undertaking re-organisations of the electricity sector.  Some 
are explicit and relate to the sector, such as improving the efficiency of the electricity industry by introducing 
competition.  These are the most straightforward, although not necessarily the easiest to evaluate.  However, 
other objectives are not specific to the sector.  For example, privatisation programmes frequently sought to 
sell all state-owned assets simply because they were state-owned, not to address any particular problems in 
the electricity sector.  In other cases, the motivation was not explicit at the time.  For example, Ministers in 
Mrs Thatcher’s government acknowledged after they left power that a primary reason for privatising the 
electricity industry was to reduce the power of the trade unions.1 In this objective, the changes were 
undoubtedly successful, and the British coal-mining union now has few members and minimal power. 
In other cases, changes to the electricity industry were imposed on national governments by international 
agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank who have frequently made loans 
conditional on the recipient country undertaking a privatisation programme.  The objective for the country 
involved was simply to gain access to funds from the IMF or World Bank.  For the World Bank, the changes 
were predicated on the assumption that privately-owned companies were sure to be more efficient than 
publicly-owned companies.  The World Bank also assumed that foreign owners from developed countries 
would bring expertise and access to investment capital.  This expertise would improve the efficiency of the 
utility and reduce prices, while the access to private sector capital would reduce the amount of capital that 
government-owned enterprises would need to borrow. 
Thus, a policy that brought no net benefit to electricity consumers might be regarded by government as 
successful if, for example, it facilitated a World Bank loan or reduced the power of trade unions.  However, 
while it is important to recognise this diversity of motives, in terms of drawing lessons for countries 
considering re-organising their electricity industry, the relevant question is: has the re-organisation brought a 
                                                     
1 See for example, Ridley, N., 1991.  My style of government.  Hutchison, London, Walker, P., 1991.  Staying Power.  
Bloomsbury, London, Parkinson, C., 1992.  Right at the centre.  Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, and Lawson, N., 
1992.  The view from no 11.  Bantam Press, London. 
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net benefit to electricity consumers and in this paper, this is the question we seek to address.  For some 
developing countries where coverage of the network is not complete, a particular issue is how far the policy 
allows for all citizens to gain access to affordable electricity supplies 
4. Case studies 
4.1. Countries that have chosen not to re-organise 
An increasing number of countries have taken political decisions to abandon plans to re-organise their 
electricity sectors before competition or privatisation had been introduced.  These include: Korea, Thailand, 
Indonesia, South Africa, Mexico and Sri Lanka.  The reasons for these changes of political direction have 
varied.  In Korea, the government, after powerful opposition to privatisation by Korean unions, 
commissioned the Korean Tripartite Commission to carry out a detailed investigation of the results of re-
organisations elsewhere in the world.  On the basis of its investigations, the Commission recommended that 
privatisation be abandoned, a recommendation accepted by the Korean president in 2005. 
In Thailand, the privatisation process was declared illegal in March 2006 by the Supreme Administrative 
Court on a variety of grounds.  It ruled that: ‘The government has abused its power in privatizing the state 
enterprise’.  A similar verdict was passed in Indonesia in 2004, where the Constitutional Court stopped 
privatisation of the nationally-owned utility, PLN on grounds that it violated the country's constitution.  
However, in 2007, the government was again planning to sell shares in PLN’s largest subsidiary, Indonesia 
Power in the second part of 2007, so the future of PLN is still in doubt. 
In South Africa, Sri Lanka and Mexico, governments have withdrawn plans to privatise the main electricity 
companies.  How far these decisions are pragmatic ones based on the implausibility of attracting a good field 
of reputable companies to buy the companies, how far they are a response to the unpopularity of these 
privatisations and how far they are considered decisions based on experience elsewhere is difficult to say.  
However, these decisions are far from immutable.  In some cases, such as Korea, national companies had 
already been split up into several parts in preparation for privatisation and introduction of competition.  
Unless governments take a decision to recreate the old companies, the new structure will be ready-made for a 
future government to resuscitate the privatisation policy.  In others, such a Mexico, the government placed 
restrictions on the part the nationally owned companies could play in new investment and, ultimately, this 
will lead to a withering away of such companies as the sector is increasingly dominated by new privately-
owned entrants. 
The lesson from these countries is that the momentum for privatisation and introduction of competition is 
strong and decisions not to adopt these options should not be regarded as immutable. 
4.2. ‘Success’ stories 
4.2.1. The UK 
While changes in the Chilean electricity industry pre-dated the UK’s 1990 privatisation, UK experience was 
the first where the model became clear.  The industry in England & Wales was previously nationally owned2 
and comprised a generation/transmission company (CEGB) and 12 regional distribution/retail companies.  
The CEGB was split into a privatised transmission company (NGC), two privatised fossil-fuel generation 
companies (National Power and Powergen) and a publicly-owned nuclear generation company (Nuclear 
Electric).  The 12 regional electricity companies (RECs) were privatised intact with an accounting separation 
between their retail and their distribution businesses.  The much smaller, but interconnected Scottish system 
previously comprised two regional, fully integrated companies, also both publicly owned.  These companies 
were privatised intact apart from the nuclear plants which remained in public ownership in a new company, 
Scottish Nuclear. 
However, the model was severely compromised by practical considerations.  These included: 
                                                     
2 In fact there are three electricity systems in the UK.  One covers England & Wales, one covers Scotland and is 
synchronised to the England & Wales system and one covers Northern Ireland.  The latter was recently connected by 
DC cable to Scotland and is synchronised to the Republic of Ireland system.  The Scottish system is now largely 
integrated with that of England & Wales.  This account mainly describes the England & Wales system that accounts for 
about 90 per cent of UK electricity demand. 
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 The wholesale market was badly designed and the government imposed transitional contracts and 
purchase obligations.  The Regulator also allowed new long-term power purchase contracts.  These 
arrangements meant that, until 1998, the amount of power that could be bought and sold at spot-
prices or spot-related prices was only 1-2 per cent of total demand.  This meant that the wholesale 
market could not play a major role in price setting, and prices were volatile and unreliable; 
 There was ambiguity about how far the generation and retail sectors should be separated.  The 1990 
structure created separate sectors, but generators were allowed to sell to large consumers and 
retailers were allowed to build their own power plants; 
 An attempt to privatise the nuclear plants failed and left the system dominated by just two privatised 
fossil-fuel generation companies with little incentive to compete.  The nuclear plants were separated 
and owned by a new, subsidised and publicly-owned company that could play no part in price-
setting; 
 There was only a minimal unbundling of the RECs’ distribution and retail businesses and the RECs 
also jointly owned the transmission company; 
 Retail competition was phased in over eight years with residential consumers only able to choose 
after 1998; and 
 The Scottish system had few competitive mechanisms, no wholesale market, and little opportunity 
for new entry. 
Since then, the system in Britain has evolved considerably, in some respects towards the ‘ideal’ model and in 
some respects away from it. 
Moves towards the ideal 
The networks have been much more fully separated from retail and generation.  In 1995, NGC became a 
fully-independent company and in 2001, the RECs were required to make a legal split between their 
distribution and retail businesses.  This meant that these businesses must be in separate companies, although 
they could be subsidiaries of a common owner.  Retail competition is now open to all consumers. 
The generation duopoly of National Power and Powergen has been progressively broken up so that there are 
now about eight generation companies, none with a market share of more than about 20 per cent.  In 1996, 
Nuclear Electric was re-organised into a small publicly-owned company with the oldest plants and a 
privatised company (British Energy) with most of the capacity and with no explicit subsidies. 
The Scottish system is now effectively integrated into the England & Wales system, with the wholesale 
market now including Scotland and much stronger connections between Scotland and England allowing 
greater trade across the border. 
Moves away from the ideal 
Attempts by the generators to buy the retail businesses of the RECs were resisted by government until 1998, 
when the government caved in.  As soon as government allowed such takeovers, the 12 retail businesses of 
England & Wales were quickly taken over by generation companies.  The generation and retail markets are 
now dominated by six integrated generator/retailers.  These are the successor companies to the two large 
privatised generation companies (National Power and Powergen), the two Scottish companies, which 
expanded into England & Wales, the French electricity company EDF, which bought three retail businesses 
and some generation capacity and the privatised gas retail company, Centrica, which sells gas and electricity 
as a package. 
Virtually all the independent generators collapsed in 2002 when the wholesale price fell and at one point, 
about 40 per cent of the Britain’s generating capacity was owned by collapsed companies.  About a third of 
the capacity was nuclear and the privatised nuclear company had to be rescued (see below) by government.  
The rest of the plant was largely bought by the six large integrated generator/retailers. 
A decision was taken to abandon the original wholesale market design (a ‘gross pool’ type model) in 1998 
and it was replaced in 2001 by a more complex voluntary (‘net pool’) market.  In practice, the difference 
between the two systems is quite small because, as before, the vast majority of power sold does not pass 
through the visible market.  Most is self-dealing by integrated generator/retailers or via long-term 
confidential contracts.  The amount of power bought and sold at known prices is still less than about 2 per 
cent of the market.  Inevitably visible prices are too volatile and unreliable for companies to rely on the 
market to buy power and companies are even less likely to use these prices as an investment signal. 
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Other changes 
The progressive loosening on restrictions on the takeover of the privatised companies has seen the UK 
electricity industry fall largely into foreign hands.  The main investors initially were US electric utilities from 
1995-98 taking over RECs.  However, after losses in markets outside the USA, American utilities began to 
withdraw from foreign markets from 1998 onwards and US utilities now have a negligible presence outside 
the USA. 
The two privatised generation companies (National Power and Powergen) were not successful and were 
taken over by the two largest German electricity companies (RWE and E.ON respectively).  Despite their 
dominant position, they made serious errors in the UK and in the foreign investments that left them 
vulnerable to take-over.  One of the Scottish companies was taken over by a Spanish electricity company 
(Iberdrola) and EDF bought into the UK market by buying generating capacity and several retail and 
distribution businesses.  The two remaining UK-owned companies (Centrica and the other Scottish 
company) are not expected to remain independent for long and are expected to be taken over by foreign 
companies. 
British Energy collapsed in 2002 and had to be rescued at huge cost to UK taxpayers (ça US$20-30bn).  As 
part of the deal, the British government took a 65 per cent stake in the rescued company although it 
subsequently sold 25 per cent of the shares in May 2007. 
The electricity and downstream gas industry has effectively merged.  All the major electricity retailers sell 
gas and the major gas retailer has been the only successful new entrant into the electricity market.  The gas 
and electricity transmission networks are owned by the same company and the there is strong overlap in the 
ownership of the gas and electricity distribution networks. 
Evaluation 
If the objective was to create an industry in which prices would be set by an open market and investment 
decisions would be taken on the basis of market signals, the UK experiment has not succeeded yet and there 
are strong reasons why, with the current market structure, it cannot. 
The dominance of the six large generator/retailers means new entry by generators or retailers is implausible 
especially after experience in 2002 when virtually the entire independent power generation sector was wiped 
out.  Given the minimal liquidity of the wholesale market to whom could a new generation company sell its 
power? And from whom could a new retail company buy its power? There are already strong suspicions that 
the six companies are not behaving competitively and with mergers and takeovers likely amongst these six 
companies, the oligopoly nature of the industry will be strengthened. 
For consumers, the UK is one of the few countries that have introduced retail competition where switching 
supplier amongst residential consumers is common.  However, the evidence is that by making the retail 
business a market, small consumers have to compete against electric intensive industry to get cheap power 
and, as a result, large consumers have done much better than small consumers.  The process if switching is 
chaotic and the evidence is that consumers are not able to identify the cheapest deal3. 
4.2.2. The Nordic market 
The reforms 
The Norwegian government’s re-organisation of its electricity sector in 1991 followed closely on the heels of 
the UK’s.  In many respects, and not by coincidence, the model was similar to that followed in the UK4.  
However, there were important differences. 
 The Norwegian electricity was fully publicly owned through the nationally owned Statkraft (about 
25 per cent of generation and all of transmission) and through a large number of locally owned 
companies.  The changes did not in any way affect this ownership pattern.  The large number of 
generation and distribution/retail companies meant that the only restructuring necessary to create a 
potentially competitive market was the separation of the transmission network as Statnett. 
                                                     
3 Effect of Liberalising UK Retail Energy Markets on Consumers, in D.  Helm (ed), The New Energy Paradigm, Oxford 
University Press, April 2007, Part III, Chapter 12, pp348-371. 
4 The Norwegian government was in the process of re-organising the Norwegian electricity system on regional 
monopoly lines, but the attractions of the British model persuaded it to change direction at the last minute and go for a 
competitive model. 
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 The Norwegian electricity system is 100 per cent hydro-electric mostly through storage dams.  Even 
before the changes, a spot market for surplus power had existed for 20 years to allow companies with 
low water stocks to buy power from companies with surplus water in their dams through a voluntary 
balancing spot market (net pool).  The wholesale market created was simply a development of this 
existing structure.  Unlike the UK Pool, it was not a compulsory market and bi-lateral contracts 
outside the visible market were expected to be the main vehicle for power sales.  However, perhaps 
because it built on an existing and trusted market, from the start, liquidity has been high, contracts 
reflect Pool prices and prices are generally seen as accurately reflecting the supply and demand 
position. 
 Retail competition was allowed for all consumers from day one.  However, the electric-intensive 
industry that the Norwegian economy depends on was given 15-20 year contracts outside the market 
at low prices, insulating them from the effects of the market. 
The Nordic countries, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, had historically traded electricity to balance 
their systems.  Sweden is about 50/50 hydro and nuclear, Finland is divided between hydro, thermal and 
nuclear, while Denmark is largely fossil fuel.  This trade was advantageous to all four countries reducing the 
reserve margins needed, allowing the hydro-generators to sell surplus hydro-power in wet years to the fossil-
fuel based systems and in dry years for the trade to reverse.  In the late 1990s, the Norwegian market was 
expanded to include the other three Nordic countries in a single electricity market, NordPool.  Sweden and 
Finland both had nationally owned companies that were dominant in the home markets with much of the rest 
of the market made up by locally owned companies and in the case of Finland, plant owned by 
manufacturing industry.  There were a large number of companies in Denmark almost all of which were 
owned by local government. 
Outcomes 
Unlike the UK market, the Nordic market has not seen massive changes since its creation.  The company 
structure has evolved a little but there have been no major changes and only limited entry by companies from 
outside the Nordic region. 
The wholesale market, Nordpool, retains high liquidity (over 30 per cent) and high credibility with bilateral 
contracts between generators and retailers and some retail contracts indexed to the spot price.  Retail 
competition for small consumers seems relatively effective in some countries, e.g., Norway, but in Denmark 
and Finland, switching rates between companies are minimal. 
However, the major question mark over the changes is the ordering of new generating capacity.  Since the 
mid-1990s, there has been minimal investment in new generating capacity other than for renewable sources, 
especially in Denmark, which are subsidised and do not have to compete in the market.  A large nuclear plant 
in Finland is also being constructed, but this is being built under very special terms.  It has a fixed price 
construction contract, a customer prepared to contract for the output of the plant at cost-plus terms for the life 
of the plant, access to very low cost finance (interest rate of 2.6 per cent) and export credit guarantees for 
much of the finance. 
Being a hydro-based system, there is more spare capacity than there would be in a thermal system to cover 
the risk from dry years but with demand growing (albeit slowly) this margin has been eroded and dry winters 
present an ever-increasing threat to supply security.  Availability of power in Norway could be more than 50 
per cent higher in a wet year than in a dry year and if, at the end of summer, levels in reservoirs are low, 
prices could be high and equally if there has been a warm, wet winter, prices in January could be low. 
In 1996, prices were at a historic peak, nearly three times the level they were at in 1993, but declined over 
the next four years before beginning to rise slowly to mid-2002.  From July to December 2002, however, 
prices rose by a factor of more than five to a peak of NOK550/MWh (€66/MWh).  Prices fell somewhat after 
then but remained at levels near the 1996 peak until winter 2005, when prices began to rise, continuing to 
rise after the winter had finished.  By August, prices were near the peak levels of 2002/03, about 75 per cent 
higher than the previous August high.  This was only partly the result of problems with the Swedish nuclear 
sector that resulted in the unplanned closure of two units at the end of July, but even before this, prices were 
around NOK400/MWh in July, 60 per cent higher than in any previous July.  Subsequently, a very wet 
autumn saw prices fall steeply.  However, while wet winters might disguise the problem for a few more 
years, the threat to security of supply if substantial new capacity is not built is clear. 
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Equally important, it is not clear how consumers, especially electric-intensive industry and residential 
consumers in Norway can tolerate this volatility and unpredictability of prices.  Electric-intensive industry, 
for which electricity purchasing might account for about half their costs, will be insulated from market 
volatility until its 15-20 year contracts run out, but unless these are renewed, it will then be exposed to the 
full risk of market-based prices.  Space-heating is almost always through electricity and in such a cold 
climate, the effect on residential consumers of high prices will be serious.  Even if the changes do produce a 
more efficient industry, this will be little consolation if price volatility means the country’s electric-intensive 
industry is forced out of the market and residential consumers are too scared of their electricity bills to heat 
their dwellings to an adequate level. 
Evaluation 
The Nordic market is clearly one of the most successful, if not the most successful, electricity industry re-
organisation worldwide.  It has seen few of the abuses of markets that other markets, such as UK, Spain and 
Italy have seen.  How far this success is due to the moderating influence of public ownership and the 
perception that Nordic business is conducted more ethically than in Anglo-Saxon countries is hard to 
determine.  Nevertheless, if new capacity is not soon constructed and prices become even more volatile, the 
political pressure to abandon the market experiment will be overwhelming. 
4.3. Failures 
4.3.1. Brazil 
The Brazilian electricity industry is effectively 100 per cent hydro-electric, based on huge storage dams (the 
largest is the 12,000MW Itaipu plant), often with a capacity of three years’ of water.  Demand has grown 
strongly since the mid-80s, typically at 7 per cent per year. 
Up to 1995, the system was primarily publicly owned.  A federally-owned holding company, Eletrobras, 
owned the five main regional generation companies and the transmission company.  The distribution sector 
was primarily owned by state government.  Brazil was one of the first developing countries to try to emulate 
the British model.  Under pressure from the World Bank, it embarked on a programme of privatisation 
selling some distribution companies even before the model for the electricity sector to be adopted had been 
decided.  Brazil received advice from Coopers & Lybrand in 1995 on how to restructure their electricity 
industry.  Its advice, in Ukraine and Colombia, was to implement a system that was effectively identical to 
that chosen in Britain in 1990 despite the very different priorities, resource dispositions and geographic 
characteristics of the two countries.  The distribution companies were progressively sold over the following 
five years, mainly to utilities from the USA, Spain, Portugal and France.  However, attempts to privatise the 
generation sector came to nothing.  Restrictions on public spending meant Eletrobras could not fund new 
generation and foreign investors did not build a significant amount of new plant.  After a couple of years 
when water levels were dangerously low at the start of the wet season but were replenished by wet rainy 
seasons, water levels were again low in 2000.  This time, rain levels were still low at the end of the wet 
season.  It became clear that supply until the next rainy season was about 25 per cent below expected 
demand.  A crash programme of power reductions did mean that there were no major blackouts and the 
subsequent rainy season was wet enough to replenish water stocks.  A very expensive programme of 
emergency generation such as diesel generators was also implemented. 
Much of the demand reduction, through measures such as energy efficient light bulbs and greater public 
awareness of demand, meant that demand did not rebound strongly and the immediate shortage of capacity 
passed although the expensive emergency generation measures still had to be paid for.  Soon after, the Lula 
government was elected on a promise to halt privatisation and severely reduce the expected role of markets 
in the electricity sector. 
Most of the foreign companies owning the distribution companies withdrew and ownership of these 
companies is now generally in Brazilian private hands.  The system for building new plants has been taken 
back under the control of the government through a new Energy Planning Agency (EPE).  This effectively 
reviews supply and demand, and commissions the construction of new capacity on the basis of a competitive 
bidding process in which the publicly owned companies can take part.  The Brazilian government has 
negotiated a relaxation to its public spending limits for expenditure in productive investments and although 
this is not sufficient to allow Eletrobras to fulfil all the investment needs of the electricity sector, it is an 
important concession.  Experience with the new system is limited but so far seems good. 
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4.3.2. Ontario, Canada 
In 2002, the Canadian province of Ontario opened its electricity market to competition with the introduction 
of a wholesale spot market and, from May 1 2002, the launch of retail competition for all consumers.  Small 
consumers could either purchase from a competitive retailer (about 1 million of Ontario's 4.4-million retail 
customers chose this option) or ‘standard supply service’ (SSS) from their local distribution utility.  Those 
that chose the latter paid rates based on the fluctuating price in the Ontario wholesale market.  In 1999, in 
preparation for this, the integrated company, Ontario Hydro, owned by the government of Ontario was split 
into a network company, Hydro One and a generating company, Ontario Power Generation (OPG).  
Measures were introduced to break the dominance of OPG in generation partly through plant sales, for 
example, the Mississagi River system was sold to Brascan in 2002 and partly through leasing facilities, for 
example, the Bruce nuclear power plant was leased to a consortium known as Bruce Power in 2001.  
However, plans to privatise Hydro One and OPG failed and OPG still remains the dominant generator in the 
province.  The distribution sector, previously dominated by municipal companies was not restructured but 
the municipal companies were turned into ‘for-profit’ companies with the opportunity to privatise or part-
privatise.   
By November 2002, after a series of price spikes, which saw retail rates nearly double in the peak-demand 
summer months, the Ontario government suspended the retail market.  They capped the price small 
consumers paid at 4.3 cents per kWh and refunded amounts paid over that price cap level.  The privatisation 
of Hydro One was stopped.  In March 2004, the price cap was raised to 4.7 cents per kWh for the first 750 
kWh and 5.5 cents for energy used above that. 
In 2004, new proposals were put forward under which the key body would be a new Ontario Power 
Authority, a public body, at arm’s length from government, set up in January 2005.  The Ontario Power 
Authority has the responsibility to monitor supply and demand and, where appropriate, to commission the 
construction of new supply facilities and implement demand reduction measures.  The wholesale electricity 
market continued, largely unchanged and choice of retail supplier would be available to all consumers, 
although small and domestic consumers would be able to choose a regulated tariff.  There are still doubts 
whether the new system will provide enough generating capacity especially if the Ontario government sticks 
to its plans to close its coal-fired plants and the nuclear plants nearing the end of their life are not 
refurbished. 
5. Lessons and Issues 
Despite nearly two decades of experience with competitive electricity markets, the new model cannot be 
claimed to have been proven.  Some areas remain untested while important lessons have been learnt in other 
areas. 
5.1. Lessons 
5.1.1. Competitive markets will not produce diversity of energy supplies 
It is often claimed that private industry is much better than publicly-owned industry at dealing with risk and 
as a result, it is expected that privatised electricity companies will develop diversified portfolios of 
generation to hedge their risks.  For the electricity sector, this has proved not to be the case.  The introduction 
of markets has shifted some of the risk of investment from electricity consumers to the companies with the 
result that the risk premium on investment is much higher.  This has made investment in high capital cost 
options such as nuclear power, unattractive, and favours options where costs and performance can be 
guaranteed, notably for combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) gas-fired stations.  As a result, in markets where 
competition has been introduced, new investment provided by the market without consumer or government 
subsidies and guarantees has almost invariably been for CCGTs.  If climate change objectives are to be met, 
new non-fossil fuel options, such as renewables and nuclear power will have to be built and there is no 
evidence the market will be willing to build these unless they are removed from the market and given 
publicly funded subsidies and guarantees.   
5.1.2. Privatisation and introduction of markets do not remove risk from consumers 
One of the major criticisms of the old system was that consumers bore all the investment risks.  If a utility 
made mistakes, the costs of these mistakes were often passed on to consumers.  In fact, this was well 
recognized by US regulators who had detailed procedures to prevent utilities passing on unjustified costs to 
consumers.  However, risk exists and if the risk is not going to be borne by consumers, private industry will 
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have to be paid for bearing this risk.  While this may act as a discipline on utilities to control costs, the 
introduction of markets brings in a new risk, market risk.  Essentially, the situation is analogous to a 
consumer deciding whether to buy insurance.  If the consumer does not buy insurance, they will bear the full 
risk if anything goes wrong.  However, if they opt for insurance, they will have to pay an insurance premium, 
which, in the long-term will cost as much as the potential losses and will also include a fee to the insurer.  It 
is far from clear whether replacing monopoly by markets will reduce costs for consumers by reducing the 
price they have to pay to deal with investment risk. 
5.1.3. Foreign investors do not generally bring major new skills 
There is little evidence that, as promised by the World Bank, Western utilities would bring skills that did not 
exist in countries where they invested.  Arguably, the reduction in R&D and training and the substantial 
redundancy programmes that have always followed privatisation of electricity industries have eroded local 
skills and capabilities.  Many of the foreign investors have re-sold the companies they bought within a few 
years leaving the local industry in a poorer shape than when the foreign companies first moved in. 
5.1.4. Foreign investors do not bring additional capital 
One of the paradoxes of the World Bank’s privatisation policy is that, while it is supposed to bring in foreign 
capital, by channelling the capital to buy existing companies, the incoming capital is being used to buy 
existing assets.  It would seem more logical if the objective was to access capital for new investments for it 
to be channelled into new investments.  Evidence from Africa shows that foreign investors will only invest if 
there is clear evidence that they will make a commercial rate of return on that investment5 and, as 
acknowledged by the World Bank, the rate of return for foreign investors in the electricity sector has been 
poor6 (Estache et al, 2005) and unlikely to encourage investment.   
5.1.5. The field of foreign investors is small and unlikely to grow 
The mid-1990s saw a huge growth of investment outside the USA by American companies.  Some were 
companies that were not traditional utilities, such as Enron, AES and Dynegy, while others were traditional 
utilities operating through subsidiaries, such as Mission Energy (SoCalEd), Entergy, Duke, Reliant, TXU, 
PSEG.  By the late 1990s, it was becoming clear that these foreign investments were far more risky and less 
profitable than expected and the companies started to dispose of their acquisitions, in some cases, simply 
surrendering the asset to the banks that had financed the acquisition.  The European utilities were more 
cautious and only EDF (France), Tractebel (Belgium/France), Endesa (Spain), EDP (Portugal) and Iberdrola 
(Spain) made major acquisitions.  The results were also disappointing and in some cases, (EDF), assets 
outside Europe have been sold and in others, no new investments will be made. 
In recent years, the main investors in foreign electricity sectors have been Pacific Rim companies such as 
Cheung Kong (Hong Kong), YTL (Malaysia) and Singpower (Singapore).  These companies are relatively 
small compared to earlier US and European investors and have tended to focus on purchasing networks 
rather than buying more risky generation assets.  Whether their experience will be better than that of their 
European and US predecessors remains to be seen, but it seems unlikely they will have the financial power to 
become major investors. 
It is therefore probable that for the future, foreign investment through traditional utilities with existing skills 
in the sector will not be significant and countries privatising their electricity industry with the expectation 
that they will see major foreign direct investment will be disappointed. 
5.1.6. Labour conditions are likely to deteriorate due to out-sourcing and cost-cutting 
Wherever privatisation and introduction of competition has taken place, there have been major reductions in 
employment in the electricity sector.  This is often portrayed by advocates of privatisation and introduction 
of competition as being solely due to the improved efficiency that private ownership and competition bring.  
In fact the reasons are more complex and often less worthy.  They include: 
 Changes in generation technology; 
                                                     
5 Hall D.  2007 ‘Electrifying Africa: power through the public sector’, PSIRU, London.  http://www.psiru.org/  
6 Estache A., Perelmann S.  and Trujillo L.  2005.  Infrastructure Performance and Reform in Developing and Transition 
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 Out-sourcing of non-core activities; 
 Out-sourcing of more central activities; 
 Reductions in R&D;  
 Mergers and takeovers; and 
 Short-term cost-cutting. 
Overall, EPSU has estimated that 300,000 jobs have been lost in the EU’s electricity industries since 1990.  
A rigorous Austrian study compared experience in a number of foreign service sectors with that of Austria.7 
It found: 
 Extensive staff retrenchment in all sectors; 
 Reduction of labour cost through income cuts and changes in pay structures; 
 Flexibilisation, condensation and lengthening of working hours; 
 Flexibilisation and individualisation of employment relationships; 
 Adverse changes in working conditions; 
 Basic and advanced training possibilities deteriorate; skill building options are limited to the core 
staff.  Measures aimed at promoting women appear to be more rhetorical than real; and 
 Deteriorating conditions for collective workers’ representation. 
5.1.7. Training and R&D budgets are likely to be cut 
Under the previous model, utilities had strong incentives to carry out training and R&D.  They would benefit 
from a well-trained work-force and from new technology.  Because they had monopoly status, the ‘free-
rider’ problem of competing companies poaching their workers and taking advantage of their R&D was not a 
threat.  As a result, research and training was often done on a collaborative basis.  If electricity is made a 
competitive activity, the ‘free-rider’ problem becomes serious and money spent on R&D and training is 
discretionary spending that can be, and generally is, saved and distributed as extra profits. 
5.1.8. Companies will frustrate the aim of introducing competition if they can 
Whilst some companies claim to relish competition, the reality is that a company’s first duty is to their 
shareholders and to maximise profits for them.  Competition is risky and, in theory, will force prices and 
profits down to a minimum level.  There are a number of ways that companies can frustrate the aim of 
competition apart from the unlawful trading practices such as those adopted by Enron.  The first is mergers 
and takeovers so that the field of competing companies is small enough that companies know that their 
interests are best served by not competing aggressively.  If the market is dominated by very large companies, 
this will be a strong disincentive for small companies to enter the market because of fear of the market power 
of the dominant companies. 
Another strategy is to integrate generation and retail businesses.  This will mean the generation business is 
not exposed to the risk and volatility of the wholesale market and, if as in the UK, the market is dominated 
by a few larger generator/retailers, the wholesale market will become meaningless and entry barriers will be 
insurmountable. 
5.1.9. IPPs are risky and are anti-competitive 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) have been used in a number of countries either to provide additional 
generating capacity that the incumbent supplier could not finance or to diversify the field of generating 
companies.  However, IPPs will only be feasible if they are given a long-term contract for power at prices 
that are guaranteed to cover all costs, a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA).  Particularly for foreign investors, 
these guaranteed profits must be denominated in a tradable currency like the US dollar.  This has proved to 
be a major risk to countries commissioning IPPs and IPP contracts have brought a number of utilities in the 
Pacific Rim to the brink of bankruptcy.  This has happened when local currencies fell sharply and when 
demand also did not grow as expected.  The take-or-pay provisions of these contracts mean that power plants 
owned by the local utility, which generated at a much lower price than the IPPs, could not be used.  Even if 
we put these heavy risks on one side, IPPs are blatantly anti-competitive.  They typically have take-or-pay 
contracts for base-load power at pre-determined prices.  The power they supply is therefore completely 
insulated from the market for the duration of the PPA. 
                                                     
7 R Atzmüller & C Hermann (2004) ‘The Liberalisation of Public Services and Its Effects on Employment, Working 
Conditions and Industrial Relations’ Working Life Research Centre, Vienna. 
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5.2. Issues 
5.2.1. Generation security of supply 
One of the promises of those advocating markets is that markets would be much more accurate in matching 
supply and demand avoiding over-investment whilst still ensuring there is enough capacity to guarantee 
security of supply.  This is based on the premise that the wholesale market will provide accurate price 
signals.  A high price will indicate when new investment is needed and a low price will force the least 
efficient suppliers to exit the market.   
Whilst this sounds plausible in theory, it does assume, first, that the price signals are reliable, second that the 
signals will appear in time for the companies to respond efficiently and third, that it will be in companies’ 
interests to respond to the price signals.  None of these assumptions is credible.  The liquidity of markets has 
been very low with the result that price signals are not credible.  Indeed, it is in the interests of companies to 
make the price signals unreliable because it will convince customers to buy power on more certain, long-
term contracts outside of the market. 
Signals could appear at very short notice.  The low elasticity of demand for power means that if demand is 
satisfied, with, say, a 5 per cent margin of spare capacity, prices will be low, but if supply and demand are 
very close, prices will sky-rocket because consumers will pay a high price just to keep the lights on.  This 
means price signals will only be felt only a short time before there are shortages, far less time, five or more 
years, than it would take to expand capacity by anything other than expensive emergency measures. 
As was demonstrated in California, generators make most money from a shortage, so unless entry barriers 
are very low, companies will have a disincentive to invest because investment will reduce the price and 
hence their profits.  As argued above, oligopolisation and integration of generation and retail mean barriers 
to entry will be high. 
5.2.2. Climate change 
It is now widely acknowledged that climate change is a major global threat and strong measures to reduce 
consumption of fossil fuels are needed.  The European Union (EU) headlines its energy policy, an ‘integrated 
climate and energy policy’, implying that policy has been developed to simultaneously satisfy the objectives 
of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and maximising economic efficiency.  Blatantly, this is not what has 
happened in the EU.  Policy has been derived with the objective of economic efficiency only in mind with 
climate change measures grafted on at the end.  This will only be an efficient way to meet the twin objectives 
if competition/liberalisation measures are, at worst, neutral to meeting climate change objectives. 
This is clearly not the case.  In a monopoly market, generators can be instructed (‘command and control’ 
policies) as to what technologies to deploy and measures can be taken to ensure that the profits of retailers 
are not dependent on how much power they sell.  This means they have no incentive to sell more electricity.  
Retailers can be used as a vehicle for implementing energy efficiency measures through ‘least cost planning’ 
policies.  These are based on the assumption that consumers want an energy service, not kWh per se.  It may 
be cheaper to buy energy efficient equipment and pay a small amount extra per kWh than to meet the 
demand that would have arisen if energy efficiency measures had not been undertaken. 
All the evidence suggests if companies are left to choose, they will buy fossil fuel plant and they are highly 
unlikely to choose low carbon sources such as renewables and nuclear power.  With a field of competing 
retailers, companies will make more money the more power they sell, and implementing energy efficiency 
measures with a consumer who could opt to switch retailer at short notice would make no commercial sense.  
So, meeting environmental objectives can only be at the expense of compromising competition.  The 
‘market-based’ mechanisms, such as a the EU’s carbon trading scheme, are a poor substitute for a real 
market and companies generally find ways to exploit these mechanisms for their own advantage rather than 
meeting the explicit objective. 
5.2.3. Will retail competition lead to a fair allocation of costs? 
One of the claimed advantages of competition is that cross-subsidies (usually from large consumers to small 
consumers but sometimes in the reverse direction), seen by free market economists as wasteful and 
inefficient, will be driven out, implying that competition will lead to a fair allocation of costs, in other words, 
the prices a consumer paid would reflect the costs they imposed. 
In fact, in a free market, the price a consumer pays will reflect their bargaining power, and introducing retail 
competition pits residential consumers against electric-intensive industry in buying power.  This is of course 
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an uneven contest and, an aluminium smelter, for example, will have far more knowledge of costs and far 
more bargaining power than an individual small consumer with the result that disproportionately low prices 
will go to the aluminium smelter, at the expense of the residential consumer. 
Retail competition for small consumers has invariably proved problematic with high transaction costs, 
logistical difficulties in switching and very low switching rates implying that consumers either have no 
incentive to switch or lack the confidence that they can identify the best deal.  This is not surprising because, 
at best, the only information consumers have is the price on the day they try to identify the cheapest supplier.  
It could easily happen, as happened to the author, that the cheapest supplier was identified, but 10 days later, 
before the switch took place (which actually took nearly 5 months), the new supplier raised its charges. 
5.2.4. Network ownership and security 
One of the main priorities in Europe has been to ‘unbundle’ the networks so fully that access to the networks 
by competing generators and retailers on equal terms can be guaranteed.  The first EU Directive (1996) 
required integrated companies to make only an accounting separation between their network activities and 
their generation/retail activities.  This was deemed to be inadequate and in the revised Directive of 2003, 
companies were required to make a legal split between their network and the competitive activities.  This 
meant that the networks had to be owned by a legally separate company, although this network company 
and, say, a generating company could be subsidiaries of a common parent company. 
Again, the Commission believes this separation is inadequate and is now pressing for a new Directive that 
will enforce ownership separation.  In other words, the owners of the network companies should have no 
interest in any electricity generation or retail activities.  This seems sensible in theory, but in practise, it 
raises the issue, not addressed by the Commission, of who should own the networks. 
In terms of security of supply, the networks are the most important part of the system.  Power station failures 
can usually be dealt with resulting in no inconvenience to consumers but a network failure could ‘black-out’ 
a region or an entire country.  It seems sensible that the owners of the network should have a strong incentive 
to maintain and develop the network in a way that ensures long-term supply security rather than short-term 
profit.  Increasingly infrastructure industries are being bought by companies with no obvious commitment to 
the sector and, for example, some electricity networks in the UK have been bought and sold 4-5 times in less 
than a decade.  To deal with this risk, some countries have chosen to take networks into public ownership.  
This is feasible for the high-profile transmission networks which represent perhaps 5 per cent of the cost of 
power, it is more problematic for the more labour intensive and much larger distribution networks. 
The risk for a country is that crucial networks will fall into the hands of companies that will ‘sweat’ the 
assets, cutting back on maintenance and investment, and sell them before the impact of their neglect is 
apparent.  As Britain has found with its privatised rail network, it is a long and expensive process bringing a 
neglected network back to an appropriate condition. 
